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Abstract
In this paper we present an application of formal verification techniques to a component-based
SDL model of a railway signalling system lent by General Electric Transportation Systems. A
MSC-driven validation technique has been applied to verify the multiple-configuration features of
the system. This work addresses the problem of validating a component-oriented designed SDL
model, with a partial reuse of previously verified MSC scenarios if a new component is introducing
or modified: some possible solutions based on the coverage metrics and information provided by
the adopted tools are discussed.
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1 Introduction
The availability of commercial tools for the support of formal speciﬁcation
and veriﬁcation has boosted in the recent years the use of formal methods
as a mean for preventing the introduction of software faults in safety criti-
cal systems, and in particular the use of those speciﬁc formalisms that the
tools support. Two major examples in this direction are SDL [1], a stan-
dard developed within the telecommunication industry, and the Statecharts
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[3] supported by the iLogix Statemate tool. We refer to [7] and [6] for two no-
table examples of application of such formalisms to railway signalling systems,
that is the application ﬁeld of interest of our study. Within a collaboration
with General Electric Transportation Systems (GETS), we have studied ﬁrst
the introduction of SDL technology in the GETS development cycle for a
multiple-conﬁguration railway signalling system [4], assessing a suitable vali-
dation technique [5]; the next step has been the investigation in the direction
of a component-based design of the previous SDL speciﬁcation. Actually, a
SDL model which should preserve multiple-conﬁguration features needs to
be described by a varying number of general components connected under a
given topology, that is, by deﬁning configurable component types: the number
of the needed instances for each component type in a given conﬁguration can
be set by means of suitable conﬁguration parameters. In this kind of model,
inserting a new component or modifying an existing one may imply not only
to change the interfaces between the existing components and the new one,
but also to modify the topology of the model. This involves to execute again
the veriﬁcation activity on all the deﬁned scenarios. In a component-oriented
SDL model, basic component speciﬁcations must be developed and veriﬁed;
then, one or more static replicas of each component, accordingly to the given
conﬁguration, are to be interconnected. A ﬁnal veriﬁcation of the obtained
model will then be performed; Message Sequence Charts (MSC) [2] can be
used to deﬁne simulation and test scenarios.
In this paper, we discuss the application of MSC driven validation to ver-
ify a simple conﬁguration from the adopted case study, by pointing out the
reuse of the test scenarios when a new component is introduced. The paper is
structured as follows: in section 2 a description of the case study is presented,
together with an overview of the component-based SDL model. Section 3
and its subsections introduce the adopted veriﬁcation methodology, detailing
the coverage measurement to evaluate the performed validation activity and
ﬁnally the obtained results.
2 The case study: SCA system
The SCA system (Sistema Conta Assi, axle counter system), developed by
General Electric Transportation Systems, G.E.T.S., is a device which counts
the number of wheelsets belonging to trains which are travelling in a given
railway section. This operation is made using suitable sensors, which are
placed aside the track. The consecutive calculations of the number of wheelsets
entering and leaving the railway section allows to establish if the section itself
is free (if the number of leaving wheelsets is equal to the number of entering
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wheelsets) or is still occupied by a train. This information is used to enable or
to forbid the next train to enter the section, by means of a suitable (external)
semaphore signalling. The SCA system is composed by several control and
acquisition units, named UCA (Unita` Conta Assi, axle counter unit), placed
along the tracks, and by detection places located aside the track, named PRA
(Punti di Rilevazione Assi, axle detection places). The UCA-PRA connection
is shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. SCA system in single-section configuration, highlighting UCA-PRA interconnection.
A PRA is formed by two magnetic sensors named DRTs (Detettore Ruota
Treno, train wheel detector), located each at one of the rails, for redundancy.
The two magnetic detectors must give the same signal consecutively. If only
one of them sends the signal of a passing wheel, the UCA goes in a ”fail-safe”
state, in which a suitable automatic locking relay, connected to the external
signalling system, is enabled. A typical eﬀect is to set all signals to red. UCA
units are located at the beginning of a section; they receive and process the
signals modulated by the DRTs, in order to determine the number of axles
running on the track; these data are sent to remote UCAs via modem. Using
remote data, the UCA can determine whether the section is still occupied or
not, and in the ﬁrst case it stops a following train by enabling the automatic
locking relay. Since a track can be generally run in two directions, UCAs
are able to check both the trains entering the railway section and the leaving
ones. The connection between remote UCAs, depicted in Figure 1, shows the
basic conﬁguration of the system: the single-section SCA can check only one
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railway section. It is formed by two UCAs, each of them placed at one end
of the section; they can receive signals coming from up to 3 PRAs. Moreover,
the SCA system can present several conﬁgurations depending on the number
of composing UCAs and on a set of parameters that are located in an external
NOVRAM and that determine the functionalities of the given conﬁguration.
We refer to [4], [5] for a detailed description of the other conﬁgurations and
their functionalities.
In this paper, we have investigated a particular case of the single-section con-
ﬁguration, in which the primary track includes a point from which a secondary
track departs. In this kind of SCA system, two PRAs are linked to the entry
UCA, in such a way as to make a so called flank-protection (see Figure 2). Due
to the presence of an additional PRA, the communication between PRA and
the UCA may result more noisy than in the single-section conﬁguration, so an
additional ﬁltering of the signals coming from the DRTs may be required.
Fig. 2. Single-section SCA with track point.
2.1 Modelling SCA
We now give a brief overview of the SDL speciﬁcation for this conﬁguration:
the model mainly reproduces the entry section UCA subsystem related to
the acquisition and processing of the signals coming from the two connected
PRAs. Actually, in a component-oriented SDL design, we need to combine
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all the replicas of the reading, ﬁltering and axle sequence checking processes
which are necessary to handle the data coming from the two PRAs. Figure
3a shows this elaboration chain up to the AnalyzeTableSlot process, which
determines if the section is free or occupied by a train, accordingly to the
number of axles counted by the PRAs. In the case of a noisy channel between
the PRA and the connected UCA, the chosen conﬁguration can be adapted
introducing an auxiliary ﬁltering process: in fact, in this SDL model it is
possible to insert a new ﬁltering component using the same interfaces between
the existing ones; this reﬂects the real case of adding a series software ﬁlter
rather than modifying and making more sophisticated, at a higher cost, the
existing one. In Figure 3b the model modiﬁed with the auxiliary ﬁltering
component is depicted. In the following section, we will show a scenario-based
validation technique starting from a set of MSCs used to verify the model of
Figure 3a. We will also point out how the component-oriented design allows
a partial reuse of these scenarios to validate the modiﬁed model.
3 Verification of the component-oriented design
A ﬁrst approach to verify a SDL speciﬁcation is by simulation. In the ex-
perience reported in [4], the simulation capabilities of the Cinderella SDL
tool were exploited to perform an initial veriﬁcation of the SCA system of its
conformance to the system requirements. During the simulation activity, the
system is handled as a black-box, which, following suitable input stimuli, must
send the expected output signals to the system environment. Simulation is
essentially a testing activity performed at the speciﬁcation level; in practice,
simulation veriﬁes the correct execution of a working scenario, that is a path
in the system state space. Instead, a validation consists in exploring the state
space (often represented by a behaviour tree) generated by the processes of
the system by executing a suitable algorithm: either exhaustive search until
reaching a speciﬁed depth, or partial search following various diﬀerent criteria
in the selection of the next state to be explored; validating a system is often
conceived as providing the evidence that all the possible behaviours of the
system have been veriﬁed, in reference to the requirement speciﬁcations, and
that the system presents no undesired behaviour. Unfortunately, though be-
ing more powerful, a validation algorithm often cannot explore all the possible
states of a system, since the state space explosion phenomenon arises, partic-
ularly for complex systems, composed by concurrent state machines as the
SCA. Actually, this fact prevents from scheduling all the possible signals from
the environment to stimulate the SDL system (this situation is described,
in System Theory terms, as a persistent exciting signal), particularly when
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Fig. 3. SCA model without and with the auxiliary filtering component (dashed encircle).
adopting an exhaustive exploration algorithm. Therefore, the validation of a
large system like the SCA needs to measure the actual amount of veriﬁcation
activity performed. We can transfer to the validation of an SDL model the
concept of coverage, which is widely used in the area of software testing to
measure the percentage of the system which has been exercised by the per-
formed tests: particular structures of a program are chosen as the unit of
coverage, so that the notion of statement coverage, branch coverage, condition
coverage, etc. . . are commonly used.
In the case of a SDL speciﬁcation, commercial tools such as Telelogic TAU re-
fer to the concept of coverage applying it to the symbols composing the SDL
model: a 100% symbol coverage is achieved by a validation eﬀort if all the
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graphic elements appearing in the SDL descriptions of the system state ma-
chines (that is, in the SDL processes) have been exercised. This assures that
all the states deﬁned in the SDL processes have been properly validated, but
it may be that not all the possible values of the process variables have been
considered: in fact, if we consider the system as composed by extended-ﬁnite
state machines (EFSMs), two system states are diﬀerent not only because of
diﬀerent states of a process, but also because of diﬀerent values assigned to the
process variables. Symbol coverage hence abstracts from values of variables.
Since the whole state space cannot be explored, the validation of the sys-
tem has been limited to the exploration of the system behaviour close to the
working scenarios; therefore, we have used a MSC-driven validation to verify
scenarios of interest described using the Message Sequence Charts formalism;
the SDL Validator provided in the Telelogic TAU SDL and TTCN suite [8]
allows to perform this partial veriﬁcation technique, by adopting Holzmann’s
Bit-State algorithm [9], already experienced with SDL speciﬁcations [10].
3.1 Incremental and MSC-driven Validation
Due to the component-oriented design of the case study SDL model, the most
natural veriﬁcation technique is to perform an Incremental Validation of the
system, which consists in validating ﬁrst each component, then the veriﬁed
components together, connected in a progressive way, up to reach the ﬁnal
conﬁguration of the system. In order to use the validation for the SCA sys-
tem in the considered conﬁguration and components, we need to use suitable
MSC scenarios to reduce the state space explosion, which is generated by
the progressive growing up of constraining interactions between the connected
components. We have ﬁrst considered and validated the conﬁguration of SCA
without the auxiliary ﬁltering component (Figure 3a); a set of 53 MSCs has
been successfully veriﬁed obtaining a symbol coverage of 91,75%. These MSCs
can be classiﬁed in two groups:
• 10 MSCs representing Black-Box interactions (Input-Output signals of the
SDL system with its environment);
• 43 MSCs designed to exercise internal states of the SDL processes.
Validating MSCs of the former group means verifying at the system level
the behaviour of the model interacting with the environment, leaving to the
validator tool the task of scheduling the transitions of the internal processes;
applying MSCs of the latter group is necessary to investigate the internal
dynamics and particular non-visible system states from the environment, for
example of fail-safe type. Figure 4 shows a MSC of the ﬁrst type, related to
the counting of an axle entering the section; this MSC aims at verifying the
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response of the system at a correct input signal sequence from the DRTs, to
perform the section occupation (each signal StateOfDrt is sampled three times
accordingly to the ﬁltering rules of the inputs from the DRTs); the target of
the MSC in Figure 5 is instead to verify the system entering the internal
fail-safe state Errors if an incorrect axle sequence is coming from DRTs.
Fig. 4. MSC scenario referred to external I/O behaviour.
3.2 Validation as regression testing after component modification
Adding or modifying a component inside the SDL model requires the new
veriﬁcation of the scenarios described accordingly to the system requirements.
We can adopt the MSC veriﬁcation technique as a suitable regression testing
activity on the modiﬁed model. Two results are expected after a component
insertion/modiﬁcation:
• the symbol coverage on the SDL model will be reduced;
• some scenarios will not be veriﬁed.
These consequences are due both to the insertion or change of the SDL
symbols in the model, and to new functionalities introduced in the system.
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Fig. 5. MSC scenario specifying the internal dynamics related to an error handling.
Fig. 6. Interfacing a new component with the other parts of the model.
Moreover, inserting a module in a component-oriented design is based on
the rule, sketched in Figure 6, that the new component should conform to the
interfaces with the other parts of the model which it will link to, using the same
signals communication syntax. In the adopted case study, the insertion of the
auxiliary ﬁltering component has produced a decrease of the symbol coverage,
which has been resulted equal to 70,76% after the regressive validation on the
set of 53 MSCs, which veriﬁed the original model. Of the 53 MSCs, 27 have
not been veriﬁed; in validation terms, it is said that they have been violated.
Of the 27 violated MSCs, 7 belong to the ﬁrst group, describing interactions
of the system to and from the environment, while the other 20 specify internal
behaviours.
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We can detect in which parts of the modiﬁed model the execution of the
violated MSCs has broken oﬀ using the Coverage Viewer and the SDL Trace
utilities, oﬀered by the SDL Validator, which can support the re-engineering
of the MSCs to obtain the desired symbol coverage.
Fig. 7. Partial coverage of the auxiliary filtering component after MSC violation.
Figure 7 shows the partial coverage, evidenced in gray, of a violated MSC
applied to the new ﬁltering component; this is due to the fact that the com-
munication semantics of the original scenario, described by the MSC, does
not agree with the new component one. Actually, introducing a series com-
ponent implies the change of the synchronization patterns between the other
processes interacting with it.
After having detected which parts of the system result uncovered, using
the tools previous mentioned, the following criteria may help in reusing the
corresponding no more veriﬁed MSCs. In order to deﬁne a MSC that can
be satisﬁed by the system in which the new series component has been in-
troduced, we should concentrate on the inputs needed by this component
to produce the outputs needed by the next components, as speciﬁed by the
satisﬁed MSC regarding the original system: therefore, we need to mark the
processes situated in the elaboration chain after the inserted component; then,
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Fig. 8. Reuse of violated MSC: the added component (dashed drawing) should be stimulated in a
suitable way to obtain the same behaviour afterwards in the processing chain.
to obtain the same output signals from this processes, that is the same ex-
ternal behaviour, we need to analyze backwards in the processing chain and
detect, starting from the processes just before the new component up to the
environment, which are the stimuli sequence that lead the new component to
produce the signals expected by the marked processes, in order to give the
desired output. This is exempliﬁed in Figure 8, which shows the redeﬁnition
of the ﬁrst part of the scenario presented in Figure 5, with the process Drt-
Seq tf reaching the internal state DrtLiberi : the communication semantics for
the original scenario (that is, which signals are required as input to let a pro-
cess produce a particular output) establishes that the transition in the state
DrtLiberi is possible if the signal DrtState is sent by the process FiltrateDrt.
In the modiﬁed MSC, the presence of the new ﬁltering component Filtrate-
DrtX2 between the the two previous processes, implies that, to produce in
output the same DrtState signal previously sent by FiltrateDrt process and so
allowing the transit of DrtSeq tf in the state DrtLiberi, two signals DrtState
must be received by FiltrateDrtX2, accordingly to the semantics of the new
component. This drives us to duplicate the whole sequence of signals from the
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environment (signals StateOfDrt) up to the FiltrateDrt process. The signals
which need to be added in the new scenario are drawn as dashed lines. These
guidelines can apply provided we know the communication semantics both of
the new component, and of the existing ones: this is possible if we know the
internal structure of the component, or if we have the MSCs describing all its
possible behaviours; the latter is applicable only for small components. More-
over, we can note that the closer the added component is to the starting point
of the processing chain, the lesser the coverage will result in the regression
validation, since the MSC will be violated very soon; however, in this case
the reuse of the MSCs will result less expensive, since fewer changes will be
applied from the new component backwards to the environment.
4 Conclusions
We have discussed an experience in the validation of a system speciﬁed in
SDL by means of commercial support tools, namely the Telelogic TAU SDL
Validator and Simulator. The experience has concentrated on the regression
validation of variations of an already validated model, showing how the oﬀered
tools can support the evaluation of the coverage of the regression validation
performed. In particular, we have addressed the case of a new software com-
ponent added in a model, and we have studied how the violated scenarios
described by Message Sequence Charts can be used to deﬁne new simulation
scenarios aimed at the full coverage of the new model.
More experimentation is needed to conﬁrm the generality of the approach; in
particular, diﬀerent topologies of the connected components will be addressed
in the future work.
As ﬁnal considerations, we want to underline the beneﬁts added to the
automatic code generation by a component-based SDL modelling, since such a
design results more accurate than a multiple-conﬁguration one in representing
the system which will be downloaded into the target device. Work is going
on dealing with the comparison using performance and complexity estimators
based on static analysis metrics between the C code generated by the Cmicro
code generator of Telelogic TAU and the handwritten version developed in
GETS.
Moreover, we can note how the availability of validation scenarios speciﬁed
by MSCs allows the test-case generation to be performed automatically using
suitable tools, such Telelogic TTCN.
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